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This paper examines the motives, timing and informal constraints of state confiscation in the Ottoman 
Empire, focusing on one of its most turbulent and confiscatory periods, 1750-1839. Utilizing a new 
dataset uncovered from confiscation inventories, I first demonstrate that confiscations were practiced 
on a selective basis, targeting some office-holders and tax farmers. Second, employing a two-step 
econometric framework inspired by the gradual nature of Ottoman confiscations, I argue that the initial 
decision whether to send an agent to confiscate one’s wealth was driven mainly by severity of war and 
expected costs of confiscation, while attributes of wealth and bargaining power of families vis-à-vis the 
central administration shaped the outcome of the second step. 
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It	is	not	that	the	whole	literature	ignored	these	issues,	but	that	many	did	not	choose	to	make	them	engines	of	their	arguments.	Like	what	happened	in	the	opening	anecdote,	Ve-itch	(1986)	conditions	the	happening	of	confiscation	to	the	availability	of	an	alternative	group	to	serve	the	same	function	as	 the	confiscated	group.	According	to	Olson	(2000),	expectance	of	short	tenures	is	responsible	for	the	sovereign’s	becoming	confiscatory.	In	an	anarchic	world,	he	writes,	roving	bandits	would	confiscate	everything	that	is	produced,	which	is	why	people	prefer	stationary	bandits	who	would	confiscate	consistent	with	rev-enue	maximization.	Hirschman	(1970)	inspired	many	subsequent	scholars	with	his	the-ory	of	the	relationship	between	power	and	predation.	He	suggests	that	asset	mobility	de-termines	one’s	ability	to	escape	from	state	predation.	In	a	similar	vein,	Vahabi	(2016)	pre-sents	the	role	of	appropriability	of	assets	as	the	most	important	factor	limiting	govern-ment	 confiscation.	Bargaining	power	of	wealth-holders	vis-à-vis	 the	 ruler	was	empha-sized	by	Levi	(1988)	and	Greif	(2008).	Given	the	lack	of	centralization	in	most	of	early	modern	world,	 rulers	heavily	depended	on	other	actors	possessing	military,	 economic	and	political	resources	(Glete	2002).	The	degree	of	this	reliance	was	a	determinant	of	their	policies	 including	confiscating	 the	wealth	of	 their	agents.	This	paper	 interrogates	such	claims	by	employing	the	Ottoman	case	as	a	testing	ground.		
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	provides	a	historical	background	of	the	Ottoman	practice	of	confiscation	as	well	as	the	period	under	question.	Section	3	offers	important	theoretical	considerations	regarding	the	ruler’s	incentive	structure.	Sec-tion	4	introduces	the	data	while	presenting	some	descriptive	statistics	to	help	understand	the	nature	of	Ottoman	confiscations.	Section	5	presents	the	empirical	strategy,	whereas	section	6	discusses	results	and	their	broader	implications.	Section	7	concludes.		
4		











of	confiscation	as	the	monetary	value	is	the	transferable	amount	or	net	value	of	wealth,	which	equal	the	total	value	of	wealth	and	receivables	minus	debts	and	direct	costs	of	con-fiscation	 (Vahabi	 2016:	 154).	 Direct	 costs	 are	 the	 costs	 of	 transportation	 and	 agency.	Agency	costs	are	the	commissions	paid	to	confiscators	and	other	less	important	agents	taking	part	in	the	enforcement.	Even	though	the	value	of	these	commissions	was	also	de-termined	by	the	duration	of	the	process,	which	is	a	function	of	the	complexity,	costs	of	agency	and	transportation	were	largely	governed	by	various	aspects	of	asset	confiscabil-ity.		
The	components	of	asset	confiscability	are,	to	a	large	extent,	associated	with	spatial	con-straints.	This	stems	from	the	intuition	that	the	capacity	and	willingness	to	confiscate	of	the	sovereign	should	be	unevenly	distributed.3	I	mainly	consider	here	the	distance	from	the	physical	location	of	the	wealth	to	where	it	is	transported	(Istanbul	with	few	excep-tions)	and	to	the	sea,	although	there	are	other	spatial	constraints	such	as	the	conditions	of	the	road	to	the	destination	and	the	administrative	status	of	the	location.	The	proximity	from	the	destination	matters	as	it	affects	direct	agency	and	transportation	costs.	There	was	indeed	a	positive	relationship	between	the	distance	and	the	confiscator’s	commis-sion.	As	for	transportation	costs,	most	assets	were	sent	to	the	capital	in	kind,	or	else	as	cash	acquired	from	auctions	in	which	they	were	sold.	In	fact,	the	spatial	aspects	of	asset	confiscability	could	have	been	influenced	by	organizational,	administrative	and	transport	technology	as	well.	However,	the	impact	of	technological	change	is	rather	negligible	since,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	there	was	not	any	significant	technological	progress	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	during	the	period	of	concern.	The	non-spatial	elements	of	asset	confisca-bility	are	the	concentration,	specificity	and	measurability	of	assets.	The	more	liquid	assets	are,	for	example,	the	more	confiscable	they	are.		
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Political	payoff,	however,	was	hardly	zero,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	confiscation	of	those	who	were	closely	linked	with	the	central	government	politically	and	economically.	Although,	 in	 theory,	 sultans	had	an	unquestionable	authority,	 there	existed	 forces	 that	balanced	their	power.	In	the	eighteenth	century,	these	forces	derived	mainly	from	the	in-creasing	influence	of	local	elites.	It	is	true	that	their	capacity	to	impact	government	poli-cies,	after	all,	proved	insufficient	to	produce	formal	institutions	that	could	effectively	and	sustainably	 constraint	 the	 sovereign	power	 (Pamuk	2012).	Nevertheless,	 sultans	were	hardly	free	from	the	risk	of	dethronement	even	though	they	were	invariably	replaced	by	other	members	of	the	same	dynasty	once	dethroned.	In	addition	to	this	risk,	under	intense	external	threat,	the	ruler	could	turn	to	confiscation	as	an	extraordinary	source	of	revenue	regardless	of	whether	it	would	have	paid	off	monetarily.		
Another	constraint	of	the	ruler	is	facing	a	trade-off	regarding	whose	wealth	to	confiscate.	In	that,	they	consider	the	bargaining	position	of	the	potential	victims.	That	is,	in	the	Otto-man	case,	targeting	an	individual	or	family	with	high	bargaining	power	was	costlier	for	three	 reasons.	 First,	 some	who	were	 organized	 as	 patrimonial	 families	 had	 their	 own	troops	in	which	they	had	been	investing	for	decades.	They	could	and	did	sometimes	use	their	 military	 power	 against	 the	 central	 government.	 Certainly,	 the	 center’s	 military	strength	was	superior	to	theirs.	But	the	fact	that	they	possessed	armed	troops	had	the	effect	of	deterrence,	especially	when	the	opportunity	cost	of	fighting	a	local	trouble-maker	was	high.	More	importantly,	many	potential	targets	of	confiscation	had	a	symbiotic	rela-tionship	with	the	imperial	center,	which	required	them	to	provision	wars	abroad	by	man-ning	imperial	armies	or	sending	food	and	munition	to	warzones	(Yaycıoğlu	2016).	Credi-bility	of	these	threats	depended	also	on	the	nature	of	fiscal	markets	they	operated.	As	for	provincial	elites,	some	enjoyed	monopolies,	while	some	had	to	compete	with	others.	A	
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family	particularly	successful	in	rent-seeking,	that	is,	capturing	monopoly	rents	of	its	area	of	influence,	was	unlikely	to	be	replaced	when	its	wealth	and	power	was	fully	confiscated.				








Military	Officials	(Askeriye)	 267	 26.25	Administrative	 and	 Palace	Officials	(Kalemiye-Saray)	 231	 22.71	Legal	Officials	(İlmiye)	 11	 1.08	
Provincial	Elites	(Ayan)	 349	 34.32	
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WAR	 War	pressure	index	based	on	war	casualties.	REBELLION	 The	 number	 of	 internal	 conflicts	including	 revolutionary	 move-ments.	DISTANCE	 Interaction	of	distance	from	Istan-bul	and	distance	from	a	port.	RELIGION	 1	if	Muslim,	0	if	non-Muslim.	
GENDER	 1	if	female,	0	if	male.		TITLE	 1	if	the	wealth-holder	has	a	title,	0	if	he	does	not.		FAMILY	 1	if	the	wealth-holder	is	a	member	of	a	prominent	family,	0	if	not.		WARZONE	 Distance	of	the	wealth-holder’s		ELAPSED	 The	number	of	years	elapsed	after	enthronement	of	the	sultan.	JUSTIFY	 1	if	justified,	0	if	not.	NET	VALUE	 Net	value	of	the	wealth	in	tons	of	silver.	LIQUIDITY	 Percentage	 of	 liquid	 assets,	 jew-elry,	 slaves	 and	watches,	 to	 total	assets.		The	main	dependent	variable	of	the	analysis	is	thus	the	outcome	of	the	confiscation	pro-cess.	It	is	a	categorical	variable	taking	two	different	forms,	outcome	1	and	outcome	2,	in	the	two	multinomial	logistic	models.	One	would	ideally	employ	the	exact	share	of	confis-cated	wealth	to	the	total	value	of	wealth.	It	was	impossible,	however,	to	identify	this	pro-portion	for	all	cases,	though	I	was	more	successful	in	determining	which	of	the	above	cat-egories	each	confiscation	fell	into.		
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All	 	 	Confiscation	 601	 59.10	No	Confiscation	 214	 21.04	Inheritance	Tax	 202	 19.86	
Total	 1017	 100	
Step	1	 	 	Send	confiscator	 832	 81.81	No	confiscation	 110	 10.82	Inheritance	tax	 75	 7.37	
Total	 1017	 100	







Variable	Name	 Min	 Max	 Mean	 SD	 Freq.	 Relative	
Freq.	
Obser-
vation	War	 0.007	 0.302	 0.134	 0.107	 	 	 1017	Rebellion	 0	 4	 0.74	 0.90	 	 	 1017	Distance	Istanbul	 1	 2409.02	 374.43	 367.36	 	 	 1017	Distance	Port	 1.64	 1454.26	 269.53	 173.19	 	 	 1017	Elapsed	 0	 31	 10.16	 6.82	 	 	 1017	Net	Value	 -33.12	 106.08	 1.13	 5.57	 	 	 828	Liquidity	 0	 100	 29.00	 33.12	 	 	 357	
Justify	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Yes	 	 	 	 	 305	 70.01	 1017	No	 	 	 	 	 712	 29.99	 	
Gender	Male	Female	












	 	 	 	 	306	771	
		 	1017	
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In	doing	so,	 I	 control	 for	a	set	of	variables	such	as	one’s	 identity,	 the	number	of	years	elapsed	after	 the	ruling	sultan’s	enthronement,	and	 the	way	confiscation	was	 justified.	The	variable	WAR	is	used	to	estimate	whether	wars	have	driven	confiscations.7	Due	to	the	lack	of	data	on	state	revenues,	it	also	serves	the	function	of	proxying	fiscal	distress	as	most	revenues	were	spent	on	wars	during	the	chosen	period.	Instead	of	the	number	of	wars,	which	would	not	capture	their	magnitude,	I	use	a	war	pressure	index	based	on	the	number	of	causalities.	Another	potential	determinant	of	the	decision	to	confiscate	could	be	inter-nal	conflicts,	since	this	was	a	period	of	rebellions	and	independence	movements.	Unlike	wars,	there	is	no	data	on	causalities	from	domestic	conflicts.	Thus,	I	use	a	dummy	variable	reflecting	the	number	of	rebellions	that	took	place	in	each	year	of	confiscation.	To	meas-ure	the	impact	of	spatiality	or	of	the	direct	costs	of	confiscation,	I	use	an	interacted	dis-tance	variable,	DISTANCE.	This	variable	is	an	interaction	of	distance	from	Istanbul	(the	destination	of	confiscated	assets)	and	distance	from	major	ports.8	
As	 for	bargaining	power,	 the	analysis	employs	 two	variables.	One	of	 them	is	a	dummy	variable	called	FAMILY,	showing	whether	the	wealth-holder	was	a	member	of	a	prominent	family.	Admittedly,	this	variable	has	certain	limits.	The	family’s	bargaining	power	vis-à-vis	the	ruler	is	indeed	the	matter	of	a	complex	long-term	relationship,	reflecting	not	only	how	much	the	sovereign	values	the	past	conduct	of	the	family	but	also	how	he	thinks	his	dependence	on	the	family	will	change	in	future.	It	is	not	possible	to	know	the	entire	his-tory	of	these	mutual	interdependences	between	the	center	and	all	1,017	families.	The	po-tential	weakness	of	this	variable	is	then	mitigated	using	another	variable	of	bargaining	power.	After	considering	that	wars	were	important	for	the	nature	of	dependence	between	the	sultan	and	the	confiscation	targets,	I	created	the	variable	WARZONE,	which	is	the	dis-tance	from	the	nearest	warzone	at	the	time	of	confiscation.9	It	captures	how	the	existence	of	a	war	nearby	impacted	the	decision	to	confiscate	the	wealth	of	the	family.		
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6.1 First-Step	Estimates	The	first-step	estimates	are	given	in	table	5.	Before	proceeding	to	the	impact	of	wars	and	expected	costs,	it	is	necessary	to	have	a	brief	look	at	two	seemingly	surprising	results.	At	first	 sight,	 the	direction	of	 the	relative	 risk	of	TITLE	seems	surprising.	 It	 suggests	 that	holding	a	title	increases	the	odds	of	the	outcome	‘send	confiscator’	compared	to	both	com-parison	groups	of	‘inheritance	tax’	and	‘no	confiscation.’	That	is,	the	central	government	was	more	willing	to	continue	the	process	of	confiscation	if	the	wealth-holder	had	a	title.	One	may	think	that	title-holders	would	be	more	capable	of	escaping	confiscation	due	to	their	better	bargaining	position.	Yet	we	must	consider	here	that	all	who	benefited	from	the	ruler’s	revenue	pie	were	title-holders	one	way	or	another.	What	this	implies	is	that	a	person	with	no	title	could	be	tolerated	more	than	one	with	a	title.		













DV	categories	 NC/SC	 IT/SC	 IT/NC	Conflict	 Interstate	Wars	 8.852**	 6.860*	 0.774	Rebellion	 0.899	 0.888	 0.987	Spatiality	 Distance	 1.482***	 1.863***	 1.256						Identity	
Gender	 	 	 				Male	 1	 1	 1				Female	 0.224	 0.791	 3.521	Religion	 	 	 				Muslim	 1	 1	 1				Non-Muslim	 0.675	 0.922	 1.480	Title	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.336***	 0.346***	 1.032		Bargaining	Power	
Family	Affiliation	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.215	 0.592	 0.487	Warzone	 1.068**	 0.969	 0.907**	Sultan	Behavior	 Elapsed	 1.067***	 1.003***	 0.939**	Rules			


















	 	 1	 	 	 2	 	
DV	categories	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	
Conflict	 Interstate	Wars	 1.893	 4.937*	 0.528	 11.973	 19.582**	 1.635	Rebellion	 1.152	 1.162	 1.008	 1.888**	 1.119	 0.593	
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DV	categories	 SK/SC	 M/SC	 SK/SC	 M/SC	
Wealth	 Net	Value	 0.935**	 0.992*	 0.859*	 1.404**	Liquidity	 	 	 1.034***	 1.019**	
Seasonality	 Month	Included	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Spatiality	 Distance	 1.553***	 1.744***	 1.738***	 1.713***		 N	 633	 633	 290	 290		 Pseudo	R2	 0.1563	 0.1563	 0.3050	 0.3050		 LR	Chi2	 133.48	 133.48	 143.96	 143.96		 Prob	Chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
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modes.	 Independent	variables	 included	in	the	model	are	an	interaction	variable	of	dis-tance	from	Istanbul	and	distance	from	the	nearest	major	port,	the	month	of	confiscation,	net	value	of	wealth	and	liquidity.	In	contrast	to	previous	regressions,	the	month	of	confis-cation	controls	here	for	the	effect	of	seasonality	or	whether	climate	or	any	other	features	of	seasonality	had	an	impact	on	the	decision.	If	the	decision	to	transfer	was	governed	by	minimization	of	transport	costs,	then	this	test	should	provide	further	proof	for	the	above	argument	that	cost-benefit	calculation	played	an	important	role	even	in	this	stage	which	we	might	call	the	third	stage	of	the	process.		





Reason/Outcome	 No	Confiscation	 Inheritance	Tax	 Total	Having	too	Much	Debt	 49	 10	 59	
Appearance	of	Heirs	 3	 0	 3	
Insignificant	Sum	 40	 1	 41	Requests	by	Mediators	 6	 0	 6	
Mercy	of	the	Sultan	 33	 2	 36	
Pardoning	of	the	Pun-ished	 3	 3	 6	
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DV	categories	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	 IT/NC	 IT/NC	
Wealth	 Net	value	 0.663***	 1.319***	 1.987***	 0.737**	 1.003	 1.360**	
Conflict	 Interstate	wars	 0.564	 6.087*	 10.786	 1.276	 4.933*	 3.863	Rebellion	 1.222	 1.113	 0.910	 1.303**	 1.030	 0.790	







Gender	 	 	 	 	 	 				Male	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Female	 0.267*	 0.184	 0.821	 0.223**	 0.167	 0.751	Religion	 	 	 	 	 	 				Muslim	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Non-Muslim	 0.164**	 0.287*	 1.788	 0.130***	 0.269**	 2.069	Title	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.217***	 0.292***	 1.347	 0.209***	 0.389***	 1.853**		
Bargaining	
Power	
Family	 Affilia-tion	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.626	 4.115***	 2.530*	 1.232	 4.615***	 3.745***	Warzone	 0.925**	 1.029	 1.112**	 0.940**	 1.052	 1.118***	
Sultan	 Be-
haviour	
Elapsed	 0.951**	 1.005	 1.056*	 0.969*	 1.001	 1.032	















DV	categories	 NC/C	 IT/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	 IT/NC	 NC/C	
Wealth	 Net	value	 0.553***	 1.319***	 2.385***	 0.895*	 1.010	 1.128*	
	 Liquidity	 0.968**	 0.958***	 0.989	 0.969***	 0.957***	 0.986	
Conflict	 Interstate	wars	 3.319	 23.318**	 7.024	 4.400	 33.457**	 7.603	Rebellion	 1.893**	 0.909	 0.480**	 1.796**	 0.809	 0.450***	
Spatiality	 Distance	 1.103	 1.302***	 1.180	 1.062	 1.357***	 1.277**	
	
Identity	
Title	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 0.302**	 0.364**	 1.201	 0.254***	 0.453**	 1.782		
Bargaining	
Power	
Family	 Affilia-tion	 	 	 	 	 	 				No	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1				Yes	 1.464	 4.331***	 2.957**	 0.896	 4.275***	 4.771**	Warzone	 0.952	 1.005	 1.055	 0.949	 1.042	 1.097	
Sultan	 Be-
havior	
Elapsed	 0.930*	 1.027	 1.104**	 0.957	 1.030	 1.076*	











Cevdet	Adliye	9/566,	 61/3687,	 84/5073,	 101/6095,	 104/6253,	 105/6277,	 25/1512,	 45/2751,	54/3288,	55/3327,	60/3628,	61/3673,	62/3729,	62/3730,	63/3754,	93/5603,	93/5604,	95/5687,	703/28713	
Cevdet	Askeriye	1041/45716	
Cevdet	Dahiliye	2/83,	 142/7090,	 156/7795,	 159/7901,	 175/8713,	 177/8815,	 182/9098,	 188/9381,	217/10808	
Cevdet	Maliye	
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1	The	roots	of	this	view	can	be	traced	back	to	early	modern	intellectuals	such	as	(Machiavelli	2007),	(Smith	1937),	(Bodin	1955).		2	Halil	İnalcık	writes	that	“although	Islamic	law	strictly	forbids	confiscation	of	private	property	from	either	Muslims	or	non-Muslims,	the	property	of	the	tax-farmer	or	any	government-related	fortunes	were	always	suspect	as	to	their	origin	and	were	therefore	subject	to	confiscation.”	Yet	the	breakdown	of	the	traditional	fiscal-military	system	in	the	eighteenth	century	significantly	made	the	practice	of	confiscation	more	selec-tive	than	before.	Thus,	we	cannot	consider,	at	least	in	the	eighteenth-century	context,	what	İnalcık	claims	as	a	rule	applicable	to	all	periods	of	Ottoman	history.		3	New	Economic	Geography	suggests	that	economic	activity	is	inherently	unevenly	distributed	in	terms	of	space	(Mackinnon	and	Cumbers	2007:	27).	The	same	logic	can	be	applied	to	the	spatial	use	of	sovereign	power.	For	this,	see:	(Allen	1997:	65-69)	4	Working	with	Ottoman	titles	is	somewhat	tricky.	For	example,	it	could	well	be	that	someone	was	men-tioned	with	more	than	one	title	in	different	sources.	When	it	comes	to	social	class,	I	mean	the	one	identified	in	Ottoman	political	terminology,	primarily	the	well-known	dichotomy	between	askeri	and	reaya	(military-administrative	and	ordinary	subjects).	For	more	on	the	interpretation	of	Ottoman	titles,	see:	(Coşgel	and	Ergene	2015:	182)		5	Property	rights	of	merchants	were	generally	well-respected.	This	is	evident,	for	example,	in	a	story	nar-rated	by	the	chronicler	Naima.	Here	Derviş	Mehmed	Paşa,	the	governor	of	Basra	reports	the	misbehavior	of	a	certain	Murtaza	Paşa	who	was	allegedly	confiscating	the	wealth	of	merchants	in	this	port	city:	“Our	maj-esty!	That	castle	at	the	shore	is	under	the	protection	of	the	sultan.	For	many	years	the	commodities	of	the	merchants	are	kept	there	safely,	and	no	one	attacks	this	castle.	The	wellbeing	of	Basra	and	other	port	cities	depends	on	 the	merchants,	and	confiscation	of	 these	commodities	will	 result	 in	 the	ruin	of	 the	country.	Merchants	are	the	immaterial	treasure	of	the	sultans.	Persecuting	merchants	and	confiscating	their	money	and	commodities	can	be	observed	neither	in	Islamic	countries,	nor	in	others.	Be	generous	and	surrender	this	ambition	(Naima	1968).”	6	 Choice	models	 are	widely	 used	 in	migration	 economics.	 In	 these,	 various	 choices	 of	migrants	 such	 as	whether	to	migrate,	where	to	migrate,	or	which	occupation	to	choose	are	estimated	by	choice	models,	either	binary	or	nominal.	The	use	of	multinomial	regression	is	not	popular	either	in	economics	or	economic	his-tory.	For	one	of	the	exceptions,	see:	(Dribe,	Olsson,	and	Svensson	2012)	7	The	baseline	data	on	war	pressure	has	been	gathered	from	Şevket	Pamuk.	I	have	adjusted	it	according	to	the	needs	of	this	study	by	employing	their	main	source:	(Clodfelter	2008).	Formula	used	in	(Pamuk	and	Karaman	2013)	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	of	their	paper.	It	suffices	to	say	here	that	the	variable	is	based	on	the	number	of	casualties,	including	captives	and	missing	soldiers	and	leaving	off	deaths	among	civilians.		8	Ports	considered	as	major	ports	are:	Thessaloniki,	İzmir,	Antalya,	Mersin,	Beirut,	Samsun	and	Trabzon.	Istanbul	was	excluded	for	it	 is	 irrelevant	for	our	purposes.	The	names	of	major	ports	have	been	derived	from:	(Balzac	1992).		9	The	data	on	warzones	comes	from:	(Clodfelter	2008).																	
																																																								
